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Real Property-ADVERSE POSSESSION. RIPARIAN RIGHTS, IMPLIED
EASEMENTS: AN INTERRELATION OF ISSUES-Bonifay v. Garner, 445
So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to acquire property by adverse possession historically
has been seen as a doctrine "very securely embedded" in the laws
of Florida.' The policy of this doctrine, which allows a claimant to
take title to land against the true owner, is not to punish those
owners who have neglected to assert their rights, but to protect
those who have, through good faith, continued in possession for the
time specified by statute.2 Adverse possession has its origins in the
common law, along with the doctrine of prescription,' but is today
largely dependent upon fulfillment of the statutory requirements
found in sections 95.16 and 95.18, Florida Statutes. 4The recent
case of Bonifay v. Garner5 highlights these statutory requirements.
It is an instructive case not only for the guidelines it reveals re-
garding adverse possession, but also because it does so in the con-
text of waterfront land shown on a plat but not designated as be-
ing a part of any of the platted lots. Another of the case's
interesting features is that at the time of the litigation, the area of
the lot in question had increased substantially from that shown on
the plat through the process of accretion. The case also involves
1. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Seward, 150 So. 257, 258 (Fla. 1933). In fact, the supreme
court in Cowgill v. Hopkins, 52 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 1951), viewed the ability to acquire
property by adverse possession as "so academic that citations to support it would be super-
fluous." In more recent times, the old policies supporting the doctrine, e.g., encouraging the
use of the greatest amount of land as possible, have succumbed to "new priorities." Meyer v.
Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973). Today the preservation of land through nonuse is seen as
an important goal. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
2. Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Beville, 98 So. 354, 356 (Fla. 1923).
3. Although courts at times use the terms "adverse possession" and "prescription" inter-
changeably, the two doctrines differ in that adverse possession is a method of acquiring title
based on exclusive possession, whereas a prescriptive right is an easement in common with
the owner and possibly the public. Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 315
(Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 138 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1961).
4. Bonifay v. Garner, 445 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
5. 445 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
6.
Accretion of land occurs in two ways: By alluvion, i.e., by the washing up of sand
or soil, so as to form firm ground; or by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks below
the usual watermark. The term "alluvion" is applied to deposit itself, while "ac-
cretion" denotes the act. However, the terms are frequently used synonymously.
Land uncovered by gradual subsidence of water is not an "accretion" but a
"reliction."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (5th ed. 1979).
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the issue of riparian rights and the existence of an implied ease-
ment of access to the water based on the plat. This Note discusses
each of these concerns and analyzes how they interrelate. In
Bonifay, Robert Garner, a lot owner in East Pensacola Heights,
sought to quiet title to waterfront property situated across the
street from the six contiguous lots he owned in the subdivision.
Garner based his claim on a reference to riparian rights in his deed
which had appeared in a valid chain of title going back to a 1908
deed from the East Pensacola City Company. In the alternative,
Garner claimed title to the waterfront property by adverse
possession.'
Barry Bonifay, also a property owner in East Pensacola Heights,
intervened in his own behalf and as a representative of a class con-
sisting of lot owners in the subdivision. Bonifay claimed an implied
easement of access to the water across the disputed property
claimed by Garner. Bonifay based his assertion on the conveyance
of his property with reference to an 1893 plat showing the disputed
property as being part of an undesignated strip running north and
south between the edge of the platted lots on the east and the wa-
ters of Bayou Texar, a navigable waterway, on the west.9 The evi-
dence showed that in 1908 a wagon trail existed along the undesig-
nated strip adjacent to Garner's property. The wagon trail was
eventually graded and paved by the county and officially desig-
nated as Bayou Boulevard.1" The dispute in this case involved that
portion of the undesignated strip between Bayou Boulevard and
the water which lies across Bayou Boulevard from Garner's lots."
Several other portions of the undesignated strip had also been the
subject of attempts to quiet title.'2
The trial court held that Garner was entitled to quiet title in
both his platted lots and in the disputed waterfront property
7. 445 So. 2d at 600. Garner's ownership of the subdivision lots was not in dispute. The
issue on appeal concerned his ownership of the property situated across the street from
these subdivision lots. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 599-600. East Pensacola City Company, a dissolved Florida corporation, C.H.
Turner Construction Company, and Escambia Realty were also made parties to the suit.
The City of Pensacola filed a supplemental brief. Id. at 600.
10. In City of Pensacola v. Walker, 167 So. 2d.634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), the court con-
cluded that there was no public dedication of the undesignated strip except as to the right
of way of Bayou Boulevard.
11. The land to which this Note refers as the "undesignated strip" is referred to as the
"disputed strip" by the court.
12. See Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 599 n.1.
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across the street from those lots," finding that the platted lots
were adjacent to Bayou Texar. The court evidently felt that the
reference to riparian rights by definition meant that the lots were
adjacent to the water. On appeal, the First District Court of Ap-
peal reversed this ruling. The court addressed the following
questions:"
(1) whether [Garner's] fee simple title to the waterfront property
[could] be sustained, based on deeds to [Garner] and his [prede-
cessors] referring to "riparian rights;" (2) whether [Garner] [had]
obtained title to the waterfront property by adverse possession;
and (3) whether [Bonifay and the other lot owners] [were] enti-
tled to implied easements of access over the disputed property. 5
II. ACQUISITION OF TITLE By ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. The Burden of Proof
In any action to quiet title, whether that action is based on ad-
verse possession or on some other ground, the burden of proof is
substantial. Under the dictate of the Florida Supreme Court, this
burden requires the plaintiff to show "with clearness, accuracy and
certainty" the validity of his title.1 This is so because the quieting
of title in one party will necessarily have an adverse effect on the
interests of the other parties.1 7 For example, in Bonifay, the quiet-
13. Id. at 599. The final judgment from which Bonifay appealed read as follows:
1. That the deed from the developer who originally platted the property herein
involved in this action, did convey Block 70, East Pensacola, according to map of
J.E. Kauser drawn in 1893, together with any rights that they may have to the
riparian rights belonging to any of the foregoing lots or blocks.
2. That [the] []ots . . . are adjacent to the shoreline of Bayou Texar and the
grantees were the recipient[s] of the riparian rights contained in the deed ....
4. The description of the property set out in the complaint is a sufficient identifi-
cation of the property ....
Id. at 599.
14. An implied easement of access can be extinguished by adverse possession. Id. at 603.
15. Id. at 600.
16. Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 229 (Fla. 1919); see also Huckins v. Duval Co., 147
So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1963); Culbertson v.
Montanbault, 133 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). In Squires v. Rispler, 69 So. 2d 177
(Fla. 1954), the supreme court held that evidence that the plaintiff had taken possession,
paid taxes on, and begun cultivation of the land in question failed to "measure up to the
high degree of certainty, clarity and positiveness required in a case of this character." Id. at
178 (citations omitted).
17. Under FLA. STAT. § 65.041 (1983), however, a person who is not a party to the litiga-
tion is not bound by the action.
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ing of title in Garner was based on acts of adverse possession
which extinguished the easements of access claimed by Bonifay
and the other lot owners in East Pensacola Heights. The justifica-
tion for such a difficult burden flows from the possibility that the
property may be quieted in the possessor as against the "true
owner." Accordingly, at least one court has suggested that quiet
title actions based on adverse possession must be proved with
greater certainty than quiet title actions based on other grounds."8
This heightened burden may be a reflection of the increasing
disfavor with which modern courts accord the acquisition of an-
other's property based on possession, even when that possession is
based on the good faith belief of the possessor that the property is
his.' In Meyer v. Law,2" Justice Boyd, writing for the majority,
saw adverse possession as a concept that is "ancient and, perhaps,
somewhat outdated .... Justice Boyd explained that the
doctrine
stems from a time when an ever-increasing use of land was to be,
and was, encouraged. Today, however, faced, as we are, with
problems of unchecked over-development, depletion of precious
natural resources, and pollution of our environment, the policy
reasons that once supported the idea of adverse possession may
well be succumbing to new priorities. A man who owns some vir-
gin land, who refrains from despoiling that land, . . . and who
makes no greater use of that land than an occasional rejuvenating
walk in the woods, can hardly be faulted in today's increasingly
"modern" world.2 2
Justice Boyd goes on to explain that as a result of these new priori-
ties, "Public policy and [the] stability of our society, . . . require
strict compliance with the appropriate statutes by those seeking
ownership through adverse possession. '2 3 Because the outcome of
18. Culbertson v. Montanbault, 133 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
19. See Genet v. City of Hollywood, 400 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The court,
expounding on the burden of proof, stated that all the elements necessary to prove adverse
possession "must be proved by clear and positive proof, and can not be established by loose,
uncertain testimony which necessitates resort to mere conjecture." Id. at 788 (quoting
Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla. 1958)).
20. 287 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1973).
21. Id at 41.
22. Id.
23. Id. Justice Boyd elaborates on this view in his dissenting opinion in Seddon v. Harp-
ster, 403 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1981). He explains that the original policies of adverse posses-
sion, i.e., that land should be put to its greatest possible use and that the possessor is im-
bued with a presumption of ownership, are no longer applicable to today's society.
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the action results in the deprivation of real property, a commodity
highly prized in today's society, or in the deprivation of some right
related to that property (as in Bonifay's case), it is appropriate
that this burden be so substantial.
In meeting this burden of high certainty, the plaintiff must also
overcome the presumption of possession in favor of the legal title-
holder. When one enters into possession of realty, he is presumed
to do so subordinately to the title of the true owner-that is, with
his permission.2 4 The burden is on the claimant to overcome this
presumption by showing that the possession was actually adverse
to the true owner.2 5 The term "adversity" means that the use made
by the possessor is "inconsistent with and contrary to the use and
rights of the owners of the property."2 In addition, it must be
shown that the possession was open,27 notorious,28 continuous and
uninterrupted for the statutory period, with continuity being the
essence of the doctrine. 29
The Florida Statutes provide the framework within which a
claimant may meet the burden of proof and acquire title to land by
adverse possession. He may do so "under color of title," pursuant
to section 95.16, or "without color of title," under section 95.18.30
B. Under Color of Title-Section 95.16
Color of title means "apparent or semblance of title as opposed
to actual title."3 1 The title need not be valid, but it must be based
24. Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973). By definition, adverse possession cannot
be permissive. Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., 97 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1957).
25. Meyer, 287 So. 2d at 41; see also Genet, 400 So. 2d at 789. FL. STAT. § 95.13 (1983)
states:
In every action to recover real property or its possession, the person establishing
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed of it within
the time prescribed by law. The occupation of the property by any other person
shall be in subordination to the legal title unless the property was possessed ad-
versely to the legal title for 7 years before the commencement of the action.
26. Birtley v. Fernandez Co., 392 So. 2d 291, 293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
27. In Porter v. Lorene Inv. Co., 297 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), the court held
that possession was open where it was recognized by various members of the community,
including family members of the person claiming record title.
28. The court in Watrous v. Morrison, 14 So. 805 (Fla. 1894), stated that the possession
must have such notoriety that it could be presumed the owner had knowledge of it. Id. at
811 (citing 1 THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA op LAW 262, 264 (2d ed. 1896)).
29. Culbertson v. Montanbault, 133 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) (citing Horton v.
Smith-Richardson Inv. Co., 87 So. 905 (Fla. 1921)).
30. These are the only two means by which a claimant can obtain title by adverse pos-
session in Florida. Meyer, 287 So. 2d at 40.
31. Carter v. Klugh, 310 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (citing Moore v. Musa, 198
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on a written instrument which purports to convey the property
and which contains a legally sufficient description of the prop-
erty.3 2 A description is sufficient if it identifies the land with the
degree of certainty necessary to ascertain the boundaries of the
land.33 Without a sufficient description, possession cannot be
"under color of title."3 4 Furthermore, the instrument must be ac-
cepted in "good faith and in the honest belief that it vests title in
the claimant. '3 5
The court in Bonifay regarded the issue of good faith as decisive
in resolving Garner's claim of adverse possession. The 1908 deed
from the East Pensacola City Company-the root of Garner's
chain of title to his platted lots-did not contain a description of
the waterfront property and, therefore, could not be used to estab-
lish adverse possession under color of title. However, as to three of
the six lots owned by Garner, there existed a 1962 deed from Gar-
ner's mother to her brother which did contain a sufficient descrip-
tion of the waterfront property.3 6 Bonifay pointed out that this
deed was executed for minimum consideration and that the follow-
ing day a deed containing the same legal description of the water-
front property was executed conveying the property back to Gar-
ner's mother (Garner's predecessor in title).
The court properly recognized these transactions as presenting
the issue of whether there was good faith and an honest belief on
the part of Garner that the title to the waterfront property was
valid. Since the issue was not addressed by the trial court in its
judgment, the district court remanded the case to the trial court so
that it could take further evidence and resolve the issue of good
faith as to these three lots. The district court reversed the ruling of
the trial court regarding the waterfront property across from the
three lots owned by Garner which did not contain a sufficient
description of the waterfront property.'
1. Proof of Possession
In order to establish title by adverse possession under sections
So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).
32. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 601 (citing Mitchell v. Moore, 13 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1943)).
33. Mitchell v. Moore, 13 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 1943).
34. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 601.
35. Id. at 602 (citing Simpson v. Lindgren, 133 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)).
36. 445 So. 2d at 602.
37. The trial court had ruled that Garner had title to the waterfront property across the
street from all six of his platted lots. Id. at 599.
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95.16 and 95.18, the occupant or those under whom he claims must
have been in continued possession of the property for seven years.
Section 95.16(2) provides that property is deemed possessed in any
of the following cases:
(a) When it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(b) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure....
(c) When, although not enclosed, it has been used for the sup-
ply of fuel or fencing timber for husbandry or for the ordinary use
of the occupant.
(d) When a known lot or single farm has been partly improved,
the part that has not been cleared or enclosed according to the
usual custom of the county is to be considered as occupied for the
same length of time as the part improved or cultivated.38
The Bonifay court found that the evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to uphold a finding of possession in Garner and his
mother. The evidence showed that Garner and his mother had ex-
ercised control over the waterfront property by fencing, improving,
and maintaining it for the requisite period of time. 9
2. The Issue of Adversity
In addition to stating the presumptions of possession, section
95.16 also provides that:
When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered
into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right, founding the claim on a written instrument as
being a conveyance of the property, . . . and has for 7 years been
in continued possession of the property included in the instru-
ment, . . . the property is held adversely.4
This language should not be deemed to create a presumption of
adversity displacing the traditional concept of adversity which re-
quires a claimant to prove that the possession was adverse, open
and notorious, as those terms have been defined by the courts. In
discussing the requirements of the two adverse possession statutes,
38. FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1983).
39. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 601; see FLA. STAT. § 95.16(2)(a), (b) (1983).
40. FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1983).
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the Florida Supreme Court, in Meyer v. Law,4 1 included the re-
quirement that a claimant show "open, continuous, actual posses-
sion, hostile to all who would challenge such possession."'' 2 It is
well settled that an interpretation of a state statute by that state's
highest court becomes an integral part of the statute. 3
Thus, in Florida, a court must conclude that a claimant has
made an affirmative showing of adverse, open and notorious use
before finding that adverse possession exists. Simply showing that
there has been possession (as defined by the statute) for seven
years is not enough, particularly in light of the substantial burden
of proof in an adverse possession proceeding.
It is not clear whether the court in Bonifay found that adversity
had been shown or whether it even considered the issue. Its short
discussion of the fact that Garner and his predecessors had fenced
and improved the property went to the issue of possession rather
than the issue of adversity." Although appropriately argued, these
two facts could have been used to show adversity. Perhaps the
court implicitly felt that they did.
A better approach would be to require a claimant to explicitly
prove those facts which show adversity as well as those that show
possession. Such a requirement would be more commensurate with
the high burden of proof traditionally associated with adverse pos-
session claims.
C. Without Color of Title
If a party asserts ownership of land based on adverse possession
but does so without a written instrument, his claim is said to be
"without color of title.' 5 Like section 95.16, section 95.18 also re-
quires proof of continued possession for seven years. Section
95.18(2) is more restrictive than section 95.16 as to what consti-
tutes possession and allows a finding of possession only "[w]hen it
[property] has been protected by substantial enclosure," or
"[w]hen it has been usually cultivated or improved."' 6 In addition,
a party claiming rights under section 95.18 must show that he
"made a return of the property by proper legal description to the
property appraiser of the county where it is located within [one]
41. 287 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 1973).
42. Id. at 40.
43. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509 (1933).
44. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 601.
45. FLA. STAT. § 95.18 (1983).
46. Id.
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year after entering into possession and has subsequently paid all
taxes . . . .", In Bonifay, neither Garner nor his predecessors in
title had paid taxes on the waterfront property; therefore, Garner
could not rely on section 95.18.
The requirement of payment of taxes is designed as a notice
mechanism. To acquire title by adverse possession, pursuant to
section 95.16, the claimant must base his claim on a recorded in-
strument. The return of taxes under section 95.18 will become part
of a public record. In either case, landowners will be able to check
public records to ascertain whether someone is adversely claiming
their property.48 In years past, when public policy called for land
to be used to the greatest extent possible, possession was deemed
to put the owner on notice.4" As Justice Boyd explained in his dis-
senting opinion in Sedden v. Harpster, "It is now much more com-
mon for persons to own land without actually possessing it. Now
the payment of taxes is presumptively a more reliable indicia of
ownership than possession. When an owner pays taxes on his land,
he is publishing to the world, 'This is my land.'5o
III. A REVIEW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS
One of the issues addressed by the court in Bonifay was whether
Garner's claim to the waterfront property could be sustained based
on a reference in his deed to riparian rights. After a description of
the lots, the deed contained the language: "Grantors hereby con-
vey any right that they may have to the riparian, rights belonging
to any of the foregoing lots or blocks. '51 The Florida Statutes de-
fine riparian rights for taxing purposes as
those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are
rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing and fishing .... Such
rights are not , of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to
the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him. They
are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land.
The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordi-
nary high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian
rights may attach.52
47. Id.
48. Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1981) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 601 (emphasis in original).
52. FLA. STAT. § 197.228(1) (1983).
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The statute does not create riparian rights. These rights exist in
Florida as a matter of constitutional right and property law and
are not dependent on the statute which defines them for tax pur-
poses. However, the statute does provide a convenient description
of riparian rights and the necessary elements which constitute
these rights.53
The landowner whose property abuts a navigable waterway does
not own riparian rights, rather these rights inure to him because he
owns the adjacent land." The rights are appurtenant to the land
and run with it. Therefore, a conveyance of the land entitles the
grantee to the riparian rights "whether or not mentioned in the
deed or lease of the upland. '55
The grantor in Bonifay did mention riparian rights in the deed
to the lots owned by Garner. However, for riparian rights to attach
to a certain parcel of land, that land must be adjacent to a naviga-
ble waterway.56 The trial court, which quieted title to the water-
front property in Garner, found that Garner's lots were "adjacent
to the shoreline of Bayou Texar and the grantees were the recipi-
ents of the riparian rights contained in the deed. .... ,,57
On appeal, the First District Court found that because the lots
were not adjacent to Bayou Texar, no riparian rights existed in
them.5' The district court's findings were based on the 1893
Kauser plat of the subdivision which showed the undesignated
strip of land between the edge of the lots and the water's edge.
The existence of this strip, in the court's view, meant that none of
the platted lots extended to the highwater mark of Bayou Texar;
therefore, no riparian rights attached and none were conveyed.
The court concluded:
Thus, a purported conveyance of "riparian rights," independently
of the underlying waterfront property, does not by implication or
otherwise convey the waterfront property itself. Here, a convey-
ance of whatever riparian rights the grantors might have in the
53. Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th -DCA 1981).
54. In Florida, the test for navigability is "whether the waterway in its natural state can
potentially provide for commercial use." Anderson v. Bell, 411 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982).
55. FLA. STAT. § 197.228 (1983).
56. These rights also attach to land bordering bodies of water which are not navigable,
such as lakes and ponds; however, these rights are referred to as littoral rights rather than
riparian rights. See Gillilan v. Knighton, 420 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
57. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 599.
58. Id. at 601.
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specified lots, which lots because of their location have no ripa-
rian rights, conveys no more than what the grantor has, to-wit:
land without riparian rights.59
Although logical, the court's reasoning leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of why the original grantor, the East Pensacola City Company,
would attempt to convey riparian rights to property not adjacent
to the water. The concept that property must abut a body of water
to make the owner a riparian owner was firmly embedded in the
common law when the lots were originally conveyed in 1908.0 One
explanation for the conveyance is that either the grantor did not
have an understanding of the concept of riparian rights, or he in-
tended that the lots extend to the water's edge, ignoring the obvi-
ous fact that the plat showed the undesignated strip between the
water and the lots. Another possible explanation is that the strip
was intended as a means of access to the water for lot owners in
the subdivision. An easement over land adjacent to a body of water
entitles the easement holder to the riparian rights attached to the
land. This issue is discussed more fully below.
IV. PLAT CREATES IMPLIED EASEMENTS OF ACCESS
In Florida, an easement may be created in three ways: by ex-
press grant, by prescription, or by implication.6 The easement
may be in gross, which means a personal interest in another's
property exists that is not attached to other land. An easement
may also be appurtenant, which means that an interest is attached
to a superior right as a dominant estate. 62
In Bonifay, Barry Bonifay asserted that as an owner of lots in
the platted subdivision he had an implied easement of access to
the waterfront.63 He based his claim on McCorquodale v. Keyton,"
-in which the Florida Supreme Court held that when lots are sold
with reference to a recorded plat or map, the purchasers "acquire
by implied covenant a private easement in lands of the grantor
other than those specifically deeded . ... 5 The purpose of the
59. Id.
60. See Axline v. Shaw, 17 So. 411 (Fla. 1895).
61. Wyatt v. Parker, 128 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
62. North Dade Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 114 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1959).
63. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 603.
64. 63 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1953).
65. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 603 (citing McCorquodale, 63 So. 2d at 910).
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rule is "not to create public rights, but to secure to persons
purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the prom-
ise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy
portions of a tract laid out in the plan indicated."6
McCorquodale concerned a developer of land who had recorded
a plat which designated a portion of waterfront property bordering
on the Gulf of Mexico as a park. The plaintiffs, purchasers of prop-
erty in the subdivision, sought to enjoin the developer from con-
structing a building for commercial use on a portion of the park
property. The court held that the plaintiffs' reliance, together with
the fact that access to and use of a beach is an "extremely valuable
right," acted to "bar the developer from denying the owners that
which he led them to believe they had. ' 67 In essence, the rule is
based on an estoppel theory, preventing a developer from making
use of property inconsistent with the use indicated by the plat.
The court added that the developer may convey fee simple title to
the designated land, but that the land would be conveyed subject
to rights of the owners of lots in the subdivision to use the land for
its designated purposes. 8 A similar situation occurred in Cartish v.
Soper,69 in which the court ruled that a plat, which designated a
portion of the subdivision as a "private parkway" extending to the
water's edge, created a private easement of access for each of the
subdivision lot owners, thus preventing the fee simple owner from
planting shrubbery across the parkway. The fact that the easement
was over land adjacent to a navigable body of water entitled the
easement holders to the riparian rights attached to the land, in-
cluding the right to build a dock.70
Based on the evidence presented in Bonifay, namely, the 1908
deed and the Kauser plat showing the unplatted strip along the
water's edge, the First District Court concluded that Bonifay and
the other lot owners had an implied easement of access across the
property. However, the court pointed out that private easements
are subject to extinguishment, leaving unanswered the issue of
whether the actions of Garner and his predecessors in title of fenc-
ing the disputed strip had cut off the implied private easements.
The rules governing the extinction of easements differ from the
66. McCorquodale, 63 So. 2d at 910 (quoting Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc., 7 A. 491, 493
(N.J. 1886)).
67. McCorquodale, 63 So. 2d at 909, 910.
68. Id. at 911.
69. 157 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
70. Id. at 154.
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rules regarding the acquisition of title by adverse possession.71
Therefore, a finding that Garner did not sufficiently prove adverse
possession does not necessarily mean that private easements have
not been extinguished. Easements may also be extinguished by
abandonment, nonuse, or estoppe. 72 The court remanded the case
to the trial court to obtain further evidence to determine whether
the easements had in fact been extinguished.
The conveyance of lots with reference to a recorded plat may
create private rights in the grantees to have areas described in the
plat maintained for their designated uses, as discussed above.
These rights are to be distinguished from public rights created by
the plat through either an express grant or through the operation
of the common law doctrine of dedication.
Common law dedication is a means by which an owner of an in-
terest in land can transfer to the public either ownership or a priv-
ilege of use for a public purpose.7 3 Dedication requires that there
be (1) an intention to dedicate the property to public use, (2) ac-
ceptance by the public, and (3) "clear and unequivocal proof' of
these facts.7 4
Ordinarily, a plat showing lots and blocks will indicate specific
areas as streets, parks, or some other open area (e.g., a beach area).
If the plat is filed and recorded, such actions constitute an offer of
dedication.7 ' The dedication does not become binding, however,
until the offer of dedication has been accepted by the public. As
stated by the court in Sebolt v. State Road Department,7 "Ac-
ceptance may be made by formal resolution, by public user, or by
acts clearly indicating acceptance." In Sebolt, the court ruled that
the state, in causing a survey team to survey a right-of-way, ac-
cepted the offer of dedication.
The court in Bonifay v. Garner did not discuss the issue of dedi-
cation of the undesignated strip to the public, stating that the
matter was not in dispute.77 However, the court did discuss the
issue in a subsequent case, Bonifay v. Dickson,78 in which Dickson
and a partner, asserting a claim of adverse possession, sought to
71. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 603.
72. Id.
73. Bonifay v. Dickson, 459 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
74. Id. at 1093-94.
75. Indian Rocks Beach South Shore, Inc. v. Ewell, 59 So. 2d 647, 651 (Fla. 1952).
76. 176 So. 2d 590, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965).
77. Bonifay, 445 So. 2d at 600.
78. 459 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
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have title quieted along the same strip as Garner, although in a
different parcel. Barry Bonifay again intervened and claimed an
implied easement of access over the property to the water. The
City of Pensacola also intervened claiming public rights-of-way
over the property as extensions of two platted streets. The court
concluded that an offer of dedication could be inferred from the
filing of the plat showing named streets and from conveyances of
lots with reference to the plat.79 An ambiguity existed as to
whether the developer also intended to dedicate the waterfront
strip since it was not specifically dedicated as was, for example, the
waterfront park in McCorquodale. By "[c]onstruing the plat as a
whole and resolving any ambiguity regarding the extent of the ded-
ication against the dedicator and in favor of the public," the court
determined that the owner intended to dedicate the strip as well as
the streets.8 0
Having found that an offer to dedicate the strip existed, the
court next discussed the issue of whether the public had accepted
the offer. The evidence showed that the county had paved and
maintained a road along the edge of the lots and had later installed
culverts under the road, Bayou Boulevard, and across the strip.8 1
These acts were deemed sufficient to prove an acceptance of the
entire strip.
The court was careful to point out that section 95.361, Florida
Statutes,82 which creates a presumption of dedication when a road
has been maintained by public authorities for four continuous
years, does not act to limit common law dedication." Hence, it was
not improper for the trial court to find that the acceptance encom-
passed the entire strip and not just the width of the road actually
maintained. Acceptance under section 95.361 is more restrictive
because that section vests fee title to the dedicated road in the
public authority, whereas common law dedication gives only rights
of easement.8 4
The most astounding aspect of Bonifay v. Dickson was the
court's gratuitous observation that the owners of the platted lots
along Bayou Boulevard also held fee title to whatever portions of
79. Id. at 1094 (citing City of Palmetto v. Katsch, 98 So. 352 (Fla. 1923)).
80. Id. at 1094 (citing Florida East Coast Ry. v. Worley, 38 So. 618 (Fla. 1905)).
81. Bontfay, 445 So. 2d at 1094. The subdivision was annexed by the City of Pensacola
in 1953 and hence the city, rather than the county, was a party to the suit.
82. FLA. STAT. § 95.361 (1983).
83. Dickson, 459 So. 2d at 1095.
84. Id.
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the undesignated strip lay directly across the street from their lots.
The court's conclusion had no effect on the litigation in that case
since the owners of the lots across from the disputed property were
not seeking to quiet title in themselves. The court intended the
statement as "a guide for future determinations regarding owner-
ship of and easement interests in this and other similarly situated
property.""6 The court's suggestion that owners of the platted lots
along Bayou Boulevard are the "true owners" of the undesignated
strip was based on Burkart v. City of Ft. Lauderdale," in which
the supreme court held that where the dedicated street runs along
a navigable body of water, the abutting lot owners own title to the
entire width of the dedicated land, as well as to the accretions
along the street.87 The general rule is that abutting lot owners own
fee title to the middle of a dedicated street.88 The rule changes
when the street borders a body of water; in this situation, the lot
owners have fee title to the entire width of the street. The court's
reliance on Burkart was misplaced since the plat did not designate
the strip as a street. Only if the entire strip shown on the plat had
been dedicated as a street could the court's conclusion be justified.
It makes more sense to construe the plat as creating an open beach
area for use by the lot owners, as was the beach area in McCor-
quodale, or to construe the plat as an offer of dedication of the
beach area to the public.
If one applies the court's analysis in Burkart to Bonifay v. Gar-
ner, then the fee title interest to the accretions which formed along
the strip would be subject to the street easement, including ripa-
rian rights incident to that easement.
V. CONCLUSION
Bonifay unites several seemingly unrelated issues and illustrates
how the resolution of one issue can change the outcome of the
others. The case arises in a context likely to be familiar to Florida
developers and landowners. A developer files a plat showing a
beach area. The size of the area increases due to accretion. The
area is used by lot owners as well as members of the general public.
An abutting lot owner attempts to fence the area or prevent others
from using it, claiming it as his own by title or by adverse posses-
85. Id. at 1096.
86. 168 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1964).
87. Id. at 70.
88. Dickson, 459 So. 2d at 1095 (citing Burns v. McDaniel, 140 So. 314 (Fla. 1932)).
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sion. The abutting landowner may even attempt to sell the land, as
was the case in Bonifay. The landowner is then confronted with
the issue of proving adverse possession or valid title. If he attempts
to prove title by adverse possession, he must meet the stringent
burden of proof required by that doctrine and must strictly adhere
to the statutory requirements. He must also overcome mounting
judicial disfavor shown toward the doctrine in recent times.
If the court makes a finding of adverse possession, that in turn
will extinguish the private rights of easement across the property
created by the plat in favor of purchasers of lots in the subdivision.
However, adverse possession does not extinguish public rights of
easement over the property; rather, the fee owner takes subject to
those rights.
The holder of an easement is entitled to the riparian rights inci-
dent to lands bordering a navigable waterway. This is true whether
the easement is public or private. Accretions formed along the edge
of the property become the property of the fee owner, but are sub-
ject to the easement.
If the plat shows a street bordering the body of water, then the
owners of lots bordering the street own fee title to the land under
the entire width of the street as well as to accretions formed along
the street. The public retains an easement over the street, as well
as over the accretions, and possesses the riparian rights incident to
that land, provided the requisite elements of common law dedica-
tion have been met.
Bonifay also vividly illustrates the need for clarity in subdivision
plats. Every area of the plat should be specifically designated.
Those areas not a part of the platted lots should be designated as
reserved for lot owners or as an offer of dedication to the public.
Purchasers of land not designated as a platted lot should be pre-
pared to prove adverse possession or to show that a Burkart situa-
tion is present.
James S. Ford
